Introduction
Blood transfusion is an essential lifesaving therapy. However, it is not without its risks, including the risk of transmission of infectious disease. Standardized laboratory processes exist in blood donation services to avert this infectious risk. International travellers are potential blood donors who may inadvertently introduce infectious disease acquired abroad into their native country's blood supply. This creates a significant challenge for blood banks whose duty it is to eliminate the risk of contamination of the blood supply with infectious agents.
The donor deferral strategy utilizing a questionnaire-based screening approach is a standard mechanism for avoiding contamination of donated blood. It is relatively simple and cost effective as a screening tool. However, its main disadvantage is the potential shortfall in available donors resulting from the blanket exclusion even of healthy travellers from donating blood for a period of time following return to their native country. Furthermore, these lengthy deferrals may discourage potential donors from donating blood in the future. 1 This article outlines the arguments for and against the selective relaxation of blood donation restrictions placed on travellers in light of recent insights into selected transfusion-transmitted diseases in non-endemic countries and the increasing availability of robust screening laboratory tests.
Malaria
Reliable data on the true incidence of transfusion-transmitted malaria (TTM) are limited by underreporting, particularly in endemic regions. In non-endemic regions, the incidence of TTM is up to two cases per million blood donations. 2 Bruce-Chwatt tabulated cases of TTM acquired between 1911 and 1972 and estimated that 2001 known cases had occurred during that interval, 43.9% of which were attributed to Plasmodium malariae infection. 3 In contrast, such cases are rare in nonendemic countries such as the USA where, during the past 50 years, 100 cases of transfusion-associated malaria have occurred, with seven of these cases arising since 1998. 4 American donors who travel to a malaria endemic country are restricted from donating blood for 12 months following their return. Similar deferral periods apply in other jurisdictions. Former residents of malaria endemic countries are deferred from donating for 3 years and individuals who have been diagnosed with malaria also cannot donate for 3 years following remission. 5 This results in approximately 150 000 blood donors in the USA being deferred annually owing to a history of travel to malaria endemic regions. 6 A study at the American Red Cross laboratory identified 5610 blood donors deferred from travelling to Mexico in 2006 and tested their plasma for Plasmodium antibodies by enzyme immunoassay and DNA by real-time polymerase chain reaction. All donors tested negative for malaria exposure. 4 A further study confirmed that the risk for malaria in Mexico varies significantly by region and that 70% of donors from the USA deferred from six blood centres had travelled to areas of very low malaria transmission risk. The authors estimated that a relaxation in the deferral practices for this cohort alone would result in the recovery of almost 65 000 blood donors annually with a risk of approximately one contaminated unit collected every 20 years. 7 In the past 100 years in the USA, as few as three civilian travellers have been identified as malaria-infected blood donors; all others had been previous residents of malaria endemic countries. 4 This pattern has also been observed in the United Kingdom where, since the introduction of malarial DNA testing, 14 donations from 138 782 screened donors were found to be positive for malarial DNA, all of which had originated from the migrant risk group arriving from malaria endemic countries and none from Perspective other travellers. 8 However, while these findings are supportive of relaxed restrictions for travellers, a recent case of transfusiontransmitted malaria in the Netherlands reported contrary findings. It concluded that P. malariae infections in non-immune travellers can occur without symptoms and persist sub-clinically for years. 9 This poses a rare but significant threat but which could be averted by adopting direct malarial DNA testing such as that which has been practised in the UK for over 10 years.
Chagas Disease
Chagas disease is a protozoal infection caused by the parasite Trypanosoma cruzi and is endemic in much of Latin America, as well as exacting a heavy burden of disease in migrants from Latin America to southern states in the USA, and to parts of Europe, especially the Iberian peninsula. Nine cases of transfusion-transmitted Chagas disease have been reported in the medical literature, seven in North America and two in Spain. The disease comprises a short acute stage followed by a clinically asymptomatic phase that lasts between 3 and 30 days with 30-40% of infected individuals progressing to a chronic phase. 10, 11 The silent phase presents a screening challenge in haematology as few parasites can be detected in the patient's blood during this period. Travellers who return from countries which are endemic for Chagas disease, therefore, present a real risk of introducing the infection into non-endemic blood pools. However, the scientific evidence may support a less restrictive approach in such travellers. In most of the documented cases of transfusion-transmitted Chagas disease the infected donor had been born in Latin America. 12 Additionally, research has demonstrated that the prevalence of T. cruzi positive donors in the Paris area, using two specific enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays against T. cruzi, was 9.7 per 100 000 tested donors, but as high as 0.31% among donors born in Latin America. 11 These findings are consistent with those from a larger earlier study in the USA where over 1.2 million donors were tested serologically for T. cruzi, and in which 32 out of 33 reactive donors had been born in endemic countries. 13 Current screening methods in the USA generally include a donor history questionnaire and a single Chagas serology test.
West Nile Virus Infection
Other infectious diseases which may be transfusion-transmitted include West Nile fever, yersiniosis, hepatitis E, babesiosis and leishmaniasis ( 
Hepatitis E
It has been demonstrated that 1.5% of blood donors in endemic areas screen positive for hepatitis E virus (HEV) RNA. 17 Those who require transfusion while travelling to endemic areas have a relatively high risk of acquiring HEV. In 2014, it was reported that HEV Genotype 3 infections were widespread in English blood donors, and while transfusion-related transmission rarely caused acute morbidity, immunocompromised patients were seen to develop persistent hepatitis E infection. 18 HEV is currently not screened for in blood donations, although in the UK, since 2016, screening of blood components for HEV before transfusion has been recommended for solid organ transplant and haematopoietic stem cell transplant recipients. 19 The authors of a recent report investigating the occurrence of asymptomatic hepatitis E infection in blood donors from various European countries recommend the use of HEV RNA screening to identify infectious blood donors. 20 
Babesiosis
While blood-borne transmission of babesiosis is uncommon, it remains the most frequently reported transfusion-transmitted parasitic infection in the USA. The incidence of transfusiontransmitted babesiosis has been steadily increasing since the 1980s, with four deaths reported up to 2005 and eight deaths reported between 2005 and 2011. 21 In the period 2002-9, of 18 adult patients hospitalised with babesiosis in the Lower Hudson Valley region of New York, USA, transfusion of infected blood products was the route of infection in two cases. 22 Babesiosis poses a significant threat to the blood supply, but there is currently no screening test approved to detect the parasite. Returned travellers with evidence or a history of infection are permanently deferred from donating blood, but implementation of screening for this parasite in blood donors may eventually be required.
Visceral Leishmaniasis
Visceral leishmaniasis is another disease for which previous infection renders the donor permanently deferred from blood donation. Although the prevalence of leishmaniasis in blood donors from endemic areas is quite high and asymptomatic injecting drug users who share needles are a reservoir for Leishmania infantum, 23 there are relatively few cases of transfusion-transmitted infection reported in the literature. This is possibly because the disease may be asymptomatic in adults and because of improvements in blood component production with leuko-reduction technology. 24 Currently, donors are questioned about previous exposure to leishmaniasis and no further screening is performed.
Vaccination and Blood Donation
With regard to vaccination and blood donor guidelines, the World Health Organisation recommends that recipients of liveattenuated vaccines be deferred for a period of 28 days after receiving the vaccine. Those receiving non-live vaccines may donate blood within 48 h, provided they are well, with the exception of the hepatitis B (HBV) vaccine for which a 14-day deferral period is recommended. 25 Variations exist in national blood transfusion service guidelines with regard to blood donation following the administration of travel vaccines. 26 
Other Infectious Risks to Blood Supply
This article has focused on selected infectious risks to the blood transfusion supply in the context of returning international travellers but it does not offer an exhaustive account of the full spectrum of rare infectious diseases that may result from blood transfusion, many of which are not routinely screened for in donated blood. Others, including cytomegalovirus, parvovirus B19, dengue, chikungunya and prion disease, are beyond the scope of this account.
Conclusion
Globalization has resulted in people of all ages travelling further and beyond traditional travel patterns. This constitutes a risk to the safety of blood transfusions through the potential importation of infectious disease to blood banks. Current methods of donor exclusion such as deferral preclude a significant number of potential donors from giving blood on the grounds of international travel alone. Evidence suggests that, rather than using these crude deferral methods, a more sophisticated approach may be warranted, which would preserve the donor pool while ensuring the safety of blood transfusion recipients. An example of such a nuanced approach may be found in the Republic of Ireland where recently the government relaxed its blanket blood donation deferral policies in the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community after carefully balancing the actual risk against the perceived risk of blood-borne viral infections from this cohort of donors, facilitated by the highly sensitive screening capabilities of a modern blood transfusion service. 27 Thus, a balance needs to exist between the minimisation of risk associated with blood transfusions and the need to maintain an adequate blood product supply for elective and emergency medical uses. A carefully obtained travel history will sensitise clinicians to pathogens with the potential for transfusion-associated infection, which may help to expedite secondary prophylaxis in both donor and recipient, thus avoiding severe disease or infective sequelae.
International travel is challenging the traditional belief in a zero-risk paradigm for blood transfusion safety and deserves a more balanced approach. 28 However, we must not adopt a complacent attitude since the infectious threat to safety of the blood supply continues to evolve and, as seen with the emergence of new areas of active Zika virus transmission, can have the potential for significant harm. 29 An evidence-based assessment of risks and benefits, in combination with the use of highly sensitive geo-medically selected laboratory screening methods, is necessary in order to safeguard blood donations, while not excluding the growing community of international travellers from this noble and potentially life-saving civic act.
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